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Abstract—In the past few years several business process
compliance framework based on temporal logic have been
proposed. In this paper we investigate whether the use of
temporal logic is suitable for the task at hand: namely to
check whether the specications of a business process are
compatible with the formalisation of the norms regulating
the business process. We provide an example inspired by real
life norms where the use of linear temporal logic produces
a result that is not compatible with the legal understanding
of the norms in the example.
I. Introduction
The term compliance can be understood in many dif-
ferent ways. Compliance can be seen as a particular type
of verication of a system. Accordingly, business process
compliance is the verication that the specication of a
system (modelled using BPM techniques) against a particular
normative framework, or more specically a set of norms.
Here, we assume a very broad denition of norms. A norm is
a statement by a body/entity (with the authority or power to
create, and eventually to enforce, such statements) prescribing
or regulating some behaviours and the non-adherence to the
norms potentially leads to some sanctions.
The main idea of business process compliance is to
determine if executing a business process according to its
specications does not result in violations of the regulatory
frameworks the business activities implemented by the
business process has to comply with. This means that in
order to verify that a business process is compliant we need
two components: (i) the formal specication of the model
of the business process and (ii) the formal representation
of the set of norms. The crucial aspect is that both formal
representations are conceptually sound, this boils down to
the following issues:
1) correct modelling of processes;
2) correct modelling of norms.
In this paper we assume that the rst of these two aspects
has been established, and that workow and business process
modelling techniques are suitable for the formal representation
of business processes. Similarly, we assume that temporal
logics, in particular, Linear Temporal Logic [1] is suitable to
model workows and other approaches to model business
processes. Temporal logic is one of the most successful
formalisms, and it is denitely able to model the sequences
of tasks corresponding to a business process, and it is able
to eciently verify large scale industrial applications. These
features motivated several researchers to adopt temporal logic
as the underlying formalism for their compliance frameworks,
see for example [2]–[7]. The analysis and representation of
norms logic and other formal modelling techniques has been
thoroughly investigated in the elds of Deontic Logic and
Articial Intelligence and Law. The debate whether temporal
logic is suitable for the modelling of norms has a long story
from [8] and supporting it to [9] casting serious doubts to
the this endeavour. In this paper we are going to argue that
approaches based on Linear Temporal Logic fail on the correct
modelling of norms aspect.
In this paper we address the question whether compliance
frameworks based on (linear) temporal logic are able to
provide conceptually sound representations of the regulatory
documents governing a business process. This means to
identify whether such compliance frameworks are able to
determine whether a business process (model) complies with
a relevant regulatory document (set of norms). We are going to
argue that the current approaches based on (linear) temporal
logic suer from a major limitation for the representation of
regulatory documents. Specically, we are going to show
that either (a) they are not able to model the notion of
permission or (b) if they do, then they produce paradoxical
results. The consequences of this limitation are, if a regulatory
document contains provisions about permissions, then, for (i)
the framework are not able to determine if a business process
complies with the regulatory document and, for (ii) they can
assess a business process as compliant when it is not, and
the other way around.
The paper is organised as follows: in the next three sections
we provide an outline the basic foundation of business process
modelling (Section II), how to model norms in the context of
business processes (Section III), and Linear Temporal Logic
(IV). We then discuss how the frameworks based on temporal
logic address the issue of compliance (Section V). The last
three sections are dedicated to presenting a compliance
scenario inspired by real life norms (Section VI), how to
model the scenario in one of the frameworks (Section VII),
showing that the representation ends in an outcome that is
not compatible with the legal understanding of the scenario,
and some nal discussion (Section VIII).
II. Business Process Modelling
A business process model is a self-contained, temporal
and logical order in which a set of activities are executed to
achieve a business goal. Typically a process model describes
what needs to be done and when (control ow), who is going
to do what (resources), and on what it is working on (data).
A typical scenario is that a business process can be executed
in many dierent ways, and a key feature of business process
models is that they provide a compact representation of the
possible ways in which a process can be executed. A possible
execution is called a trace, and a trace is then a sequence
of task to be performed to achieve the business goal of the
process. While dierent languages have been proposed for
the modelling of business process, in this paper we ignore
the specic aspects of how a process model is represented
in a particular language, and we consider a business process
model as the set of the possible ways in which the process
can be executed; thus we consider a process model as a set
of traces.
The performance of each task in a process can change the
state of the environment where the process is situated. Thus
for each sequence of events or tasks we have a corresponding
sequence of states, and given that compliance is not restricted
to what actions are legal or mandatory, but it is concerned
with the eects of the actions, thus to check that a process
is compliant we have to check that no illegal actions are
performed, all mandatory actions are executed at the proper
times, and that the process does not result in any illegal
states. To account for this aspect [10], [11] proposed to use a
bijection that associates each task in a trace a set of formulas
corresponding to the state of the environment after the task
has been executed in the particular trace. Notice, that dierent
traces can results in dierent states, even if the tasks in the
traces are the same. In addition, even if the end states are the
same, the intermediate states can be dierent. Accordingly,
we extend the notion of trace. First of all, given a process P
and the set of traces TP corresponding to it1, we introduce
the function
State : TP × N 7→ 2L ,
where TP is the set of trace corresponding to business process
P , L is the set of formulas of the language used to model the
annotations. Let us illustrate with an example the meaning of
the function State. Suppose we have the trace t = 〈A,B,D,E〉,
and that State(t , 3) = {p,q, r }. This means that {p,q, r } is the
state resulting after executing D in the trace t (D is the
third task in t ). Notice that a trace uniquely determines the
sequence of states obtained by executing the trace. Thus, in
what follows we use a trace to refer to a sequence of tasks,
and the corresponding sequence of states.
III. Modelling Norms
The scope of norms is to regulate the behaviour of their
subjects and to dene what is legal and what is illegal.
Norms typically describe the conditions under which they
are applicable and the normative eects they produce when
applied. In this paper we concentrate on the deontic eects of
1We refer to [11], [12] for the full characterisation of the set of traces of
a business process model. All we want to remark here is that that there is a
one to one correspondence between the tasks in a trace and a (nite) subset
of the set of natural numbers N.
norms, i.e., the obligations, prohibitions and permissions that
enter in force when norms are triggered.
Let us start by considering the basic denitions for such
concepts:2
Obligation A situation, an act, or a course of action to which
a bearer is legally bound, and if it is not achieved or
performed results in a violation.
Prohibition A situation, an act, or a course of action which
a bearer should avoid, and if it is achieved results in a
violation.
Permission Something is permitted if the obligation or the
prohibition to the contrary does not hold.
Obligations and prohibitions are constraints that limit the
space of actions of processes; the dierence from other types
of constraints is that they can be violated, and a violation
does not imply an inconsistency within a process with the
consequent termination of or impossibility to continue the
business process. Furthermore, it is common that violations
can be compensated for, and processes with compensated
violations are still compliant [13]. Not all violations are
compensable, and uncompensated violations means that a
process is not compliant. Permissions cannot be violated, thus
permissions do not play a direct role in compliance. This is one
of the reasons why permission are not consider a rst class
citizen in compliance perspective. However, as we are going to
show in the rest of the paper, ignoring them can have severe
consequences; they can be used to determine that there are no
obligations or prohibitions to the contrary, or to derive other
deontic eects, which then inuence the determination if a
process is compliant or not. Legal reasoning and legal theory
typically assume a strong relationship between obligations
and prohibitions: the prohibition of A is the obligation of ¬A
(the opposite of A), and then if A is obligatory, then ¬A is
forbidden [14]; similarly permission is the lack of obligation
to the contrary, thus A is permitted if ¬A is not obligatory.
Accordingly, we can restrict our analysis to the notion of
obligations.
Compliance means to identify whether a process violates
or not a set of obligations. Thus, the rst step is to determine
whether and when an obligation is in force. Hence, an
important aspect of the study of obligations is to understand
the lifespan of an obligation and its implications on the
activities carried out in a process. As we have alluded to
above norms give the conditions of applicability of obligations.
The question then is how long does an obligation hold for,
and based on this there are dierent conditions to full
the obligation. In this paper we follow the classication
and semantics of obligations proposed in [10], [11]. For
the purpose of the paper we restrict our attention to the
notions of achievement obligation, maintenance obligation and
compensable obligation. The rst two notions refer to the
life-cycle of an obligation, and the conditions to full of
2Here we consider the denition of such concepts given by the OASIS
LegalRuleML working group. The OASIS LegalRuleML glossary is available
at http://www.oasis-open.org/apps/org/workgroup/legalruleml/download.php/
48435/Glossary.doc.
violate the obligation. An obligation remains in force until
terminated or removed. Thus the key concept is if to full
an obligation we have to obey to it for all instants in the
interval in which it is in force, maintenance obligations, or
whether doing or achieving the content of the obligation
at least once is enough to full it, achievement obligations.
For achievement obligations another aspect to consider is
whether the obligation could be fullled even before the
obligation is actually in force. If this is admitted, then we
have a preemptive obligation, otherwise the obligation is non-
preemptive. The notion of compensable obligation is related
to the possible eects of violating an obligation, and whether
the violation can be compensated for (and the process still
be deemed somehow acceptable) or the violation results in
an unrecoverable situation.3
Denition 1 (Obligation in force): Given a process P , and a
trace t ∈ TP . We dene a function
Force : TP × N 7→ 2L .
The function Force associates to each task in a trace a set
of literals, where these literals represent the obligations in
force for that combination of task and trace. These are among
the obligations that the process has to fulll to comply with
a given normative framework. In the rest of the section we
are going to give denition specifying when the process has
to fulll the various obligations (depending on their type) to
be deemed compliant.
Denition 2 (Achievement Obligation): Given a process P
and a trace t ∈ TP , an obligation o is an achievement obligation
in t if and only if ∃n,m ∈ N,n < m such that
1) o < Force(t ,n − 1),
2) o < Force(t ,m + 1), and
3) ∀k : n ≤ k ≤ m,o ∈ Force(t ,k )
An achievement obligation o is violated in t if and only if
• o is preemptive and ∀k : k ≤ m, o < State(t ,k );
• o is non-preemptive and ∀k : n ≤ k ≤ m, o < State(t ,k ).
An achievement obligation is in force in a contiguous set
of tasks in a trace. The violation depends on whether we have
a preemptive or a non-preemptive obligation. A preemptive
obligation o is violated if no state before the last task in which
o is in force has o in its annotations; for a non-preemptive
obligation the set of states is restricted to those dened by
the interval in which the obligation is in force.
Denition 3 (Maintenance Obligation): Given a process P
and a trace t ∈ TP , an obligation o is a maintenance obligation
in t if and only if ∃n,m ∈ N, n < m such that:
1) o < Force(t ,n − 1),
2) o < Force(t ,m + 1), and
3) ∀k : n ≤ k ≤ m,o ∈ Force(t ,k )
3The denitions in this section are based on [10], [11]. We further refer
the reader the same sources for more detailed presentations and concrete
examples, for real acts, for all types of obligations.
A maintenance obligation o is violated in t if and only if
∃k : n ≤ k ≤ m,o < State(t ,k ).
Similarly to an achievement obligation, a maintenance
obligation is in force in an interval. The dierence is that
the obligation has to be complied with for all tasks in the
interval, otherwise we have a violation.
The next three denitions are meant to capture the notion of
compensation of a violation. The idea is that a compensation
is a set of penalties or sanctions imposed on the violator, and
fullling them makes amend for the violation. The rst step
is to dene what a compensation is. A compensation is a
set of obligations in force after a violation of an obligation
(Denitions 4 and 5). Since the compensations are obligations
themselves they can be violated, and they can be compensable
as well, thus we need a recursive denition for the notion of
compensated obligation (Denition 6).
Denition 4 (Compensation): A compensation is a function
Comp : L 7→ 2L .
Denition 5 (Compensable Obligation): Given a process P
and a trace t ∈ TP , an obligation o is compensable in t if and
only if
1) Comp(o) , ∅ and
2) ∀o′ ∈ Comp(o),∃n ∈ N : o′ ∈ Force(t ,n).
Denition 6 (Compensated Obligation): Given a process P
and a trace t ∈ TP , an obligation o is compensated in t if and
only if it is violated and for every o′ ∈ Comp(o) either:
1) o′ is not violated in t , or
2) o′ is compensated in t .
For a stricter notion, i.e., a compensated compensation
does not amend the violation the compensation was meant
to compensate, we can simply remove the recursive call, thus
removing 2. from the above condition.
The set of traces of a given business process describes the
behavior of the process insofar as it provides a description
of all possible ways in which the process can be correctly
executed. Accordingly, for the purpose of dening what it
means for a process to be compliant, we will consider a
process as the set of its traces.
Intuitively a process is compliant with a set of norms if it
does not violate any norm in the set. Given that, in general,
it is possible to perform a business process in many dierent
ways, thus we can have two notions of compliance:
Denition 7: Let N be a normative system.
1) A process P fully complies with N i every trace t ∈ TP
complies with N .
2) A process P partially complies with N i there is a trace
t ∈ TP that complies with N .
The dierence between these two denitions of compliance
is that the rst case ensures that all possible executions
are compliant, i.e., no execution results in a state with
(uncompensated) obliations, while the second establishes that
it is possible to execute the process without violating the
norms. In both cases the denition depends on the notion of
“to comply with”.
Denition 8: A trace t complies with a normative system
N = {n1,n2, . . . } i all norms in N have not been violated.
In Section III we provided various types of norms with their
semantics in terms of what constitutes a violation of a norm
of that type. The possibility of a norm to be violated is what
distinguish norms from other types of constraints. Then, given
that violations are possible, one has to consider that violations
can be compensated. Is a process where some norms have
violated and compensated for compliant? To account for this
possibility we introduce the distinction between strong and
weak compliance. Strong compliance corresponds to Denition
8. Weak compliance is dened as follows:
Denition 9: A trace t weakly complies with a normative
system N i every violated norm has been compensated for.
In the rest of the paper we concentrate on the notion of
weakly compliance.
IV. Linear Temporal Logic
The semantics of Linear Temporal Logic [1] is equipped
with three unary temporal operators:
• Xϕ: next ϕ (ϕ holds at the next time);
• Fϕ: eventually ϕ (ϕ holds sometimes in the future); and
• Gϕ: globally ϕ (ϕ always holds in the future).
In addition we have the following binary operators:
• ϕ Uψ : ϕ until ψ (ϕ holds until ψ holds);
• ϕ W ψ : ϕ weak until ψ (ϕ holds until ψ holds and ψ
might not hold).
The operators above are related by the following equivalences
establishing some interdenability among them:
• Fϕ ≡ > U ϕ,
• Gϕ ≡ ¬F¬ϕ,
• ϕWψ ≡ (ϕ Uψ ) ∨ Gϕ.
The semantics of LTL can be given in terms of transition
systems. A transition system TS is a structure
TS = 〈S,R,v〉 (1)
where
• S is a (non empty) set of states
• R ⊆ S × S such that ∀s ∈ S∃t ∈ S : (s, t ) ∈ R
• v is a valuation function v : S 7→ 2Prop
where Prop is the set of atomic propositions.
Formulas in LTL are evaluated against fullpaths (also
called traces or runs). A fullpath is a sequence of states
in S connected by the transition relation R. Accordingly,
σ = s0, s1, s2 . . . is a fullpath if and only if (si , si+1) ∈ R.
Given a fullpath σ , σi denotes the subsequence of σ starting
from the i-th element, and σ [i] denotes the i-th element of σ .
Equipped with the denitions above, the valuation condi-
tions for the various temporal operators are:
• TS,σ  p (p ∈ Prop) i p ∈ v (σ [0]);
• TS,σ  ¬ϕ i TS,σ 6 ϕ;
• TS,σ  ϕ ∧ψ i TS,σ  ϕ and TS,σ  ψ ;
• TS,σ  Xϕ i TS,σ1  ϕ;
• TS,σ  ϕUψ i ∃k : k ≥ 0, TS,σk  ψ and ∀j : 0 ≤ j < k ,
TS,σj  ϕ;
• TS,σ  Gϕ i ∀k ≥ 0, TS,σk  ϕ;
• TS,σ  Fϕ i ∃k ≥ 0, TS,σk  ϕ.
A formula ϕ is true in a fullpath σ i it is true at the rst
element of the fullpath. Next we dene what it means for a
formula ϕ to be true in a state s ∈ S (TS, s  ϕ).
TS, s  ϕ i ∀σ : σ [0] = s, TS,σ  ϕ . (2)
As we have seen the semantics of LTL is given by a discrete,
totally order set of time instants. This structure is isomorphic
to a subset of the set of natural number, and thus it is
isomorphic to a trace of a process. In Section II we introduced
the function State to populate the state resulting from the
execution of the tasks in a process trace. It is immediate to
see, given a process trace t , the correspondence between State
and the valuation function v . Also, it is easy to model the
conditions for denitions for the various types of obligations
in LTL. If we ignore the triggering conditions and deadlines,
a maintenance obligation can be modelled using G and an
achievement obligation using F. The full denition for a
maintenance obligation for ϕ can be given by
G(τ → ϕ U δ ) (3)
where τ is a formula corresponding to the condition of
activation of the obligation and δ is a formula encoding
the deadline for the obligation. Similarly, for an achievement
obligation for ϕ we have
G(τ → ¬(¬ϕ U δ )). (4)
Compliance then is reduce to problem of determining, given
a model encoding a trace of a business process and a set of
formulas encoding the relevant norms, whether the formulas
are a satisable by the model.
V. Modelling Business Process Compliance
Automated compliance checking of the legal requirements
of the business processes is highly desirable. Often times
these requirements are written in natural language and must
be translated into a machine-readable format for automated
verication. Generally formal languages e.g., event-calculus,
temporal logic, deontic logic etc., providing the reasoning
support are used to translate the legal requirements. However,
these languages are dicult to understand due to their com-
plexity in terms of usability and comprehensibility especially
for non-technical users, e.g., process analysts and compliance
experts. Thus, usability of the formal languages is one of
the main concerns for non-technical users who possess less
knowledge of these languages [3]. To address the usability
concern of the formal languages, researchers proposed to
embed the formulas in a formal language translating the com-
pliance requirements into easy to understand visual patterns
or graphs. This lead the emergence of many graph/patterns
based compliance verication approaches in business process
compliance domain such as BPMN-Q [4], COMPAS [2], [3],
DECLARE [7] etc.
In the rest of the section we focus on COMPAS and
its underlying Compliance Requirement Language (CRL)
since it includes most of the patterns used by the other
frameworks as well additional patters meant to represent
features specic of normative reasoning, such as exception to
rule and compensations of violations. However, the analysis
can be extended to other compliance frameworks based on
temporal logics.
COMPAS is a compliance governance framework which
provides all-round compliance support for SOA based systems.
The framework is grounded LTL based graphical patterns
representing dierent types of compliance rules, and are
grouped into three distinct categories of patterns: atomic
patterns, resources patterns, and composite patterns. The atomic
patterns are based on the Dwyer’s property specication
patterns [15], and categorised into occurrence and ordering
patterns as follow:
• isAbsent (ϕ isAbsent): indicates that ϕ should not exist
throughout the process model.
LTL Formula: G¬ϕ
• Exists (ϕ Exists): represents that ϕ should occur at least
once within the process model.
LTL Formula: Fϕ
• Bounded-Exists (ϕ BoundedExist ≤ 2∗ with bound ≤ 2):
shows that ϕ must occurs at most 2 times within the
process.
LTL Formula: ¬ϕW (ϕW (¬ϕW (ϕW ¬Fϕ)))
• ϕ BoundedExist ≥ 2∗ with bound ≥ 2: shows that ϕ must
occurs at least 2 times within the process.
LTL Formula: ¬ϕW (ϕW (¬ϕW ϕ))
• isUniversal (ϕ isUniversal): indicates that P should always
be true throughout the process.
LTL Formula: Gϕ
• Precedes (ϕ Precedes ψ ): meaning that ψ is always
preceded by ϕ.
LTL Formula: ¬ψ W ϕ
• Chain-Precedes (ϕ Precedes (σ ,τ )): meaning that a se-
quence of σ ,τ must be preceded by ϕ .
LTL Formula: F(σ ∧ XFτ ) → (¬σ U ϕ)
• (σ ,τ ) Precedes ϕ: meaning that ϕ must be preceded by a
sequence of σ ,τ .
LTL Formula: F(ϕ) → (¬ϕ U (σ ∧ ¬ϕ ∧ X(¬ϕ U τ )))
• LeadsTo (ϕ LeadsTo ψ ): indicates ϕ must always be
followed by ψ .
LTL Formula: G(ϕ → Fψ )
• Chain-LeadsTo (ϕ LeadsTo (σ ,τ )): shows that ϕ must be
followed by a sequence of σ ,τ .
LTL Formula: G(ϕ → F(σ ∧ XFτ ))
• (σ ,τ ) LeadsTo ϕ: indicates that a sequence of σ ,τ must
be followed ϕ.
LTL Formula: G(σ ∧ XF(τ ) → X(F(τ ∧ Fϕ)))
• DirectlyFollowedBy (ϕ DirectlyFollowedBy ψ ): shows that
Requires ϕ to be followed by ψ .
LTLFormula: G(ϕ → Xψ )
In addition to the atomic patterns CRL denes the following
composite patterns
• CoExists (ϕ CoExists ψ ): meaning that the presence of ϕ
mandates that ψ is also present
LTL Formula Fϕ → Fψ
• CoAbsence (ϕ CoAbsence ψ ): shows the absence of ϕ
mandates that ψ is also absence
LTL Formula G¬ϕ → G¬ψ
• Exclusive (ϕ Exclusive ψ ): suggests presence of ϕ man-
dates the absence of ψ . And the presence of ψ mandates
the absence of ϕ
LTL Formula (Fϕ → G¬ψ ) ∧ (Fψ → G¬ϕ)
• Substitute (ψ Substitute ϕ): indicates ψ substitutes the
absence of ϕ
LTL Formula G¬ϕ → Fψ
• Corequisite (ψ Corequisite ψ ): ϕ andψ should either exist
together or to be absent together
LTL Formula (Fϕ → Fψ ) ∧ (Fψ → Fϕ)
• MutexChoice (ψ MutexChoice ψ ): meaning that Either ϕ
or ψ exists but not any of them or both of them
LTL Formula (Fϕ ∧ G¬ψ ) ∨ (Fψ ∧ G¬ϕ)
These patterns are mapped into LTL formulas (see the
description above) enabling the translation of compliance
requirements language (CRL) expression into a set of LTL
formulas. Essentially, these patterns are used to represent dif-
ferent types of obligations e.g., achievement, prohibitions etc.
In addition, to model contrary-to-duty obligations (compen-
sations) and non-monotonic requirements (exceptions), CRL
also incorporates extended atomic patterns namely: Else and
ElseNext patterns. These patterns giving the CRL expressions
are conjunctively formed with LeadTo and DirectlyFollowedBy
atomic patterns as:
ϕ (LeadsTo |DirectlyFollowedBy) ϕ1 (Else |ElseNext )
ϕ2 . . . (Else |ElseNext ) ϕn (5)
where ϕ is the rule condition, ϕ1 is the primary action,
and ϕ2, . . . ,ϕn are compensatory actions. Essentially, the
compensation pattern implements the if-then-else conditional
structure of the compensatory rules. Accordingly, Directly-
FollowedBy and LeadsTo dene the ordering of the primary
activity whether ϕ1 directly occurs immediately after ϕ or it
occurs in sometimes in future. The LTL equivalence formula
for compensatory patterns as follows:
G(ϕ → F|X(ϕ1 ∧1≤i<n−1 (F|X(ϕi NotSucceed ) ∧
(ϕi NotSucceed → F|Xϕi+1)))) (6)
where ϕ gives the antecedent of the compensatory rule i.e.,
rule’s conditions; ϕ1 is the head of the rule representing the
primary action that must be taken; ϕ2, . . . ,ϕn represents the
compensatory actions that must be taken if the conditions of
the rule are violated; and i is a natural number i.e., n ∈ N;
and ϕi NotSucceed represents the decision point that checks
whether ϕi holds.
In addition to the generic rules patterns, CRL oers patterns
for modelling non-monotonic requirements. This allows CRL
to model exceptions. More specically, exceptions provides
conditions under which the primary requirement might not
hold. Following [16] CRL has two patterns for exceptions: one
for strong exceptions and one for weak exceptions: A strong
exception on the primary rule mandates that whenever the
strong exception holds, the primary rule must not hold. While
a weak exception indicates that when the weak exception
holds, the primary rule may or may not hold. The patterns
for strong and weak exception are as follows:
1) strong exception: [[R]]Pattern,
2) weak exception: [R]Pattern;
where [[R]] and [R] are the LTL formulas encoding the excep-
tion conditions and Pattern is the LTL formula corresponding
to the primary requirement the exception applies to.
Given the potential recursive nature of exceptions (i.e., to
be able to capture exceptions to exceptions), CRL recursively
resolves the dependencies of the exception conditions, using
the following translation to LTL
1) [[R]]Pattern is translated to ϕ → ¬ψ ,
2) [R]Pattern is translated to ϕ ∨ψ ;
where ϕ is the LTL formula corresponding to R and ψ is the
LTL counterpart of Pattern.
VI. A Privacy Act
In this section we introduce the scenario proposed in [9]
to show limitations of temporal logic for the modelling of
norms.
Suppose that a Privacy Act contains the following norms:4
Section 1. The collection of personal information is forbidden,
unless acting on a court order authorising it.
Section 2. The destruction of illegally collected personal
information before accessing it is a defence against
the illegal collection of the personal information.
Section 3. The collection of medical information is forbidden,
unless the entity collecting the medical information
is permitted to collect personal information.
In addition the Act species what personal information and
medical information are, and they turn out to be disjoint.
Suppose an entity, subject to the Act, collects some personal
information without being permitted to do so; at the same
time they collect medical information. The entity recognises
that they illegally collected personal information (i.e., they
collected the information without being authorised to do
so by a Court Order) and decides to remediate the illegal
collection by destroying the information before accessing it.
Is the entity compliant with the Privacy Act above? Given
that the personal information was destroyed the entity was
excused from the violation of the rst section (illegal collection
4The Privacy Act presented here, though realistic, is a ctional one.
However, (i) it is based on the novel Australian Privacy Principles (APP),
Privacy (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012, and (ii) sections with the
same logical structure as the clauses of this ctional act are present in the
APP Act.
of personal information). However, even if the entity was
excused from the illegal collection, they were never entitled
(i.e., permitted) to collect personal information5, consequently
they were not permitted to collect medical information; thus
the prohibition of collecting medical information was in force.
Accordingly, the collection of medical information violates
the norm forbidding such an activity.
VII. Privacy Act in CRL/LTL
In this section, rst we are going to show how to represent
the Privacy Act of Section VI in CRL, and then we combine
with a simple business process model implementing the
activity of collecting data. Based on the CRL representation
we are going to assess if the process is compliant or not.
Following the analysis in [9] Section 1 establishes two
conditions:
i. Typically the collection of personal information is for-
bidden; and
ii. The collection of personal information is permitted,
if there is a court order authorizing the collection of
personal information.
Section 2 can be paraphrased as follows:
iii. The destruction of personal information collected illegally
before accessing it excuses the illegal collection.
Similarly to Section 2, Section 3 states two conditions:
iv. Typically the collection of medical information is forbid-
den; and
v. The collection of medical information is permitted
provided that the collection of personal information is
permitted.
Based on the above discussion, if we abstract from the
actual contents of the norms, the structure of the act can be
represented by the following set of norms (extended form):
E1. A is forbidden.
E2. A is permitted given C (alternatively: if C , then A is
permitted).
E3. The violation of A is compensated by B.
E4. D is forbidden.
E5. If A is permitted, so is D.
To compensate a violation we have to have a violation the
compensation compensates. Moreover, to have a violation
we have to have an obligation or prohibition, the violation
violates. Accordingly, it makes sense to combine E1 and E3
in a single norm, obtaining thus the following set of norms
(condensed form):
C1. A is forbidden; its violation is compensated by B.
C2. A is permitted given C (alternatively: if C , then A is
permitted).
C3. D is forbidden.
C4. If A is permitted, so is D.
Based on the above analysis we can tackle the issue of how
to represent the norms as CRL requirements. That something
5If they were permitted to collect personal information, then the collection
would have not been illegal, and they did not have to destroy it.
is forbidden means that it should not appear in the process,
thus we can use the isAbsent pattern. For the compensation
the natural choice is to use the Else/ElseNext pattern. C2 and
C4 set (weak) exceptions to the primary norms, C2 to the
prohibition of the norm in C1, and C3 to the norm in C3.
Accordingly the rst approximation is
CRL1. R1 : ([R2]A isAbsent) Else B,
CRL2. R2 : C ,
CRL3. R3 : [R4]D isAbsent,
CRL4. R4 : A isPermitted.
First of all we like to point out that a prohibition corresponds
to a maintenance obligation, and it is represented by as
isAbsent. However, the rst problem we have here is that
the translation of Else/ElseNext pattern cannot be used for
maintenance obligations. The translation given in (6) results
in the following LTL formula
G(F|X(G¬A ∧ F|X(A ∧ (A→ F|XB)))). (7)
This formula is always false, given the conjunction of G¬A
and F|XA. The key reason why the pattern does not work
for maintenance obligations and prohibitions is that the
condition for a maintenance obligation for not succeeding is
that the obligation has been violated, meaning that we have
the opposite of the obligation (see Section VI, Denition 3,
and notice that in a temporal logic setting o < State(t ,k ) is
equivalent to ¬o ∈ State(t ,k ) or, in LTL parlance, TS, tk  ¬o).
Consequently, as remarked in [9], a violation of a maintenance
obligation is represented in LTL by the formula Gϕ ∧ ¬ϕ. To
obviate this problem we can use the solution advanced in
[9], where the compensation of maintenance obligation is
semantically dened as
TS,σ  ϕ ⊗ψ i ∀i ≥ 0, TS,σi  ϕ; or
∃j,k : 0 ≤ j ≤ k, TS,σj  ¬ϕ and TS,σk  ψ . (8)
Syntactically, this can be represented by the LTL formula
Gϕ ∨ F(¬ϕ ∧ F|Xψ ). (9)
The next issue we have to address is how to model permissions
in CRL. Given that it is not possible to violate a permission,
permissions seem not to play any role in compliance. CRL does
not support specic patterns for the modelling of permissions.
While it is true that permissions cannot be violated, and thus
they are not needed for the semantics for compliance. To
determine when a process is compliant one has to know what
are the obligations in force for the various states traversed
by the traces of the process. Accordingly, a domain expert
who understands the regulatory requirement can populate
the Force function based on her understanding of the legal
framework the process is subject to. This means that in that
approach one can dispense from a logical representation of
the regulatory requirements. However, this approach becomes
rapidly unattainable, given that, even for small to medium
size business processes, the number of traces and states in
the traces is large and so is the number of obligations and
prohibitions ([11] reports on a real life case study with a
medium size process, containing approximately 40 tasks, that
would require to populate over 25,000 states, with over 100
obligations).
The discussion so far suggests that we need methods to
(automatically) determine what obligations are in force given
a set of regulatory requirements. Furthermore, the scenario
given in Section VI demonstrates that permissions can play
a role in compliance: they can be used as conditions that
determine when other obligations or prohibitions are in force.
For example, consider the compliant process where (1) the
entity checks whether the collection of personal information
is authorised under a court order. Then, if a court order exists
(2) it proceeds to collect personal information, (3) it collects
medical information. This process would be deemed as not
compliant, since R4 would resolve in D (collection of medical
information) is absent but it occurs in the process.
As we have seen in Section VI in legal theory a permission
is considered as the absence of obligation to the contrary.
Thus, in deontic logic the deontic operator for permission (P)
is assumed to be dual of the operator for obligation (O), i.e.:
Pϕ ≡ ¬O¬ϕ . (10)
In the case at hand the obligation is a maintenance obligation,
and, as we have argued, it corresponds to the isAbsent pattern,
which is translated as G¬A; its dual is FA. Thus, based on this
analysis the translation from CRL to LTL gives the following
two formulas:
LTL1. G(C ∨ (G¬A ∨ F(A ∧ FB)));
LTL2. G(FA ∨ G¬D).
CRL2 and CRL4 are incorporated in the translations of CRL1
and CRL3, i.e., LTL1 and LTL2 respectively.
Consider now the following process to collect information.
Collect
Personal
Information
Collect
Medical
Information
Destroy
Personal
Information
T1 T2 T3
Start End
This process has a single trace, 〈Start,T1,T2,T3, End〉. The
transition system corresponding to this trace has the following
transitions:6
(start,T1), (T1,T2), (T2,T3), (T3, end), (end, end) (11)
Suppose that for a particular instance of the process there is
no court order authorising the collection of medical data, i.e.,
¬C holds for all the states reached by the execution of the
process. Thus, the evaluation function associated to the trace
is as follows:
• v (start) = {¬A,¬B,¬C,¬D};
• v (T1) = {A,¬B,¬C,¬D};
• v (T2) = {A,¬B,¬C,D};
• v (T3) = {A,B,¬C,D};
6The (end, end) is mandated by the semantics of LTL that requires each
state to have a successor; for the state corresponding to the termination of
the process, the successor is itself.
• v (end) = {A,B,¬C,D}.
It is easy to verify that the transition system corresponding to
the trace of the process is a model of the formulas encoding
the privacy act, LTL1 and LTL2. This means that the formulas
are satised in all the states in it. For LTL1 we notice that is
the rst disjunct, ¬C is always false, but the second disjunct
is satised: every state in the transition system has a state
following it where A holds, and there is a state following it
where B holds. For LTL2, the rst disjunct is true, for each
state, there is a state following it where A holds, thus FA holds.
Thus, the process is compliant with the LTL formulas encoding
the CRL patterns modelling the privacy act. However, there is
state T2 where both ¬C and D hold. In Section VI we argued
that a situation where ¬C and D both hold is not compliant.
Therefore, we have a paradox, the formalisation indicates that
the scenario is compliant, the course of actions described by
the transition system does not result in a contradiction, so no
illegal action is performed (or better, the collection of personal
information is illegal, but its compensation, destruction of the
personal information, makes full amends to it), but our legal
intuition suggests that the collection of medical information
in the circumstances of the scenario is illegal.
VIII. Discussion
In this paper we have examined whether compliance
framework based on temporal logic, in particular LTL, are
able to represent norms in a conceptually sound way. The
answer seems to be negative. The results is the consequence
of the use of LTL as underlying formalism as highlighted in
[9] and its inability to handle permissions.
We would like to point out that the discussion in the
previous section just shows that a particular formalisation
based on LTL is not suitable to represent the scenario, not
that LTL per se is not able to represent the scenario. Indeed
one could create all possible full paths in a transition system
not breaching the norms, and then use the paths to synthesise
the norms that regulate the transition system. However, we
believe that such ex post analysis is useless. First humans
have to perform the reasoning to determine which norms
hold and when and then which paths violate the norms. In a
compliance perspective, i.e., in situations where one wants
to determine if the specications of a system comply with
a set of norms, this approach requires to have an oracle
able to discern the compliant executions (traces) form the
non-compliant ones [13], and based on the oracle analysis to
remove the traces resulting in violations. This means that LTL
is not used for reasoning about the norms and the transition
system, and verifying whether the transition system complies
with the norms. But the strength of LTL is the ability to verify
specications against transition systems. However, in such a
case, given that the specications (i.e., the formalisation of the
norms) are derived from the transition systems (which have
been determined to be compliant by the oracle) the verication
is always positive and totally uninformative. Furthermore, we
believe that the formalisation we proposed, while naive, is
extremely intuitive. The major objection is that permissions
are modelled using F, and we hinted that F might be suitable
to model achievement obligation, and using a particular type
of obligation to model permissions is not appropriate and
counter-intuitive outcomes are to be expected. We fully agree
with this objection, but if we agree that a permission is the lack
of an obligation to the contrary, then F is the natural choice
for permissions for prohibitions (maintenance obligations).
The other issue is that if we do not use F, the issue is how
to model permission, and the alternative is that LTL does
not support permissions. The act we presented clearly shows
that there are acts where permissions must be represented
and that permissions play an important role in determining
which obligations are in force and when they are in force.
Hence, any formalisation excluding permission is doomed
to be unable to represent the vast majority of real life legal
norms.
What about other patterns to model permissions, for
example, introducing the justication of the reasons why
the A is permitted or the lack of the compensation. The
rst response to this objection is that, then, the formal
representation would not correspond to the textual provision,
broking the isomorphism principle for the formalisation of
legal knowledge [17], meaning that, again, an external oracle
is needed to provide the proper formalisation of the conditions
depending on the interpretation of the norm, the other norms,
and the process. The second objection is that several of such
patterns do not really solve the problem or introduce counter-
intuitive results with other processes: for instance, using the
formula C → FA (saying that eventually A in case of C) as R
is of no avail since in the case at hand ¬C makes it true and
we can ignore again the other disjunct.
Next, a natural question is whether branching time logics
with path quantiers such as CTL and CTL∗ are more apt for
this task.7 In such logics permissions could be formalised by
EF. While modelling permissions using path quantiers seems
a better option and provides more exibility for modelling
norms, it does not solve the problem with the scenario
we proposed, given that the problem requires just a single
(non) branching trace to arise, and thus path quantiers are
essentially irrelevant.
This paper provides a (realistic) set or norms that shaws
that current approaches to business process compliance based
on temporal logic patters are not suitable for the task at hand
(i.e., to determine whether a process complies with the norms),
since the result they provide is not aligned with the expected
outcome based on the legal interpretation of the scenario. The
reason being that they fails to represent and reason with the
norms in a conceptually sound way. Accordingly, they cannot
be used to check compliance of real business processes with
real norms.
7For a discussion of the pros and cons of linear and branching time logics,
we refer to [18], though such discussion is not on their capability of modelling
norms.
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